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PROFESSIONAL LEADERSHIP AND
OLIGARCHY: THE CASE OF THE ICAEW
Abstract: This paper examines the difficulty of achieving representative and effective governance of a professional body. The collective
studied for this purpose is the Institute of Chartered Accountants in
England and Wales (formed 1880) which, throughout its existence,
has possessed the largest membership among British accounting associations. Drawing on the political theory of organization, we will
explain why, despite a series of measures taken to make the constitution of its Council more representative between formation date and
1970, the failure of the 1970 scheme for integrating the entire U.K.
accountancy profession remained attributable to the “detachment of
office bearers from their constituents” [Shackleton and Walker, 2001,
p. 277]. We also trace the failure of attempts to restore the Council’s
authority over a period approaching four decades since that “disaster”
occurred [Accountancy, September 1970, p. 637].

INTRODUCTION
Voluntary associations in common with organizational entities in general have at the apex of their administrative structure
a body charged with the responsibility of leadership. In the case
of professional associations, such leadership has as a central
motivation the pursuit of the professional project on behalf of
its members. However, Macdonald [1995, pp. 57-58, 204-205] explains how the membership of a professional body can constrain
the capacity of its leadership to mobilize economic, social, poAcknowledgments: We express our gratitude and appreciation to Stephen
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litical, and organizational resources in pursuit of a professional
project. Using the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England
and Wales (ICAEW) for this case study, we find no shortage of
examples of this happening in the last ten years or so. For example, the Council’s 2001 proposal to restructure the ICAEW’s
traditional district society system was overtly challenged and
contended in a poll [Accountancy, August 2001, p. 12]. Council’s
plans in1996 and 1999 to introduce electives (optional papers)
into the ICAEW’s final examinations met strong opposition and
were rejected by the membership [Accountancy, February 1996,
p. 11; July 1999, p. 6]. Indeed, members have been proactive as
well as reactive in challenging the authority of Council. Initiatives taken in 1996 and 1998, designed to achieve direct election
of the ICAEW president by the membership rather than by the
Council, although defeated in a poll, have been judged to effect a
diminution of its credibility [Accountancy, February 1996, p. 12;
July 1998, p. 20].
Momentous events that further highlight the persistent lack
of authority on the part of the Council are the series of failed
merger initiatives, including a number in the recent past, where
the aspirations of the ICAEW’s leadership were thwarted by the
membership. The fragmented organizational structure of the
U.K. accountancy profession can be traced to the diverse nature
of the work undertaken by British accountants in the second
half of the 19th century [Edwards and Walker, 2007]. Merger
initiatives have been intended to reduce the plethora of societies
which, for example, totaled at least 17 in the early 1930s [Stacey,
1954, p. 138] and, as a result, produce the advantages associated
with a more unified accountancy profession [Shackleton and
Walker, 2001, p. 166; Council Minutes Book Y, p. 148]. There
have of course been important instances of successful mergers
which include amalgamation of the five societies formed in English cities (Liverpool, London, Manchester, and Sheffield) during
the 1870s to create the ICAEW in 1880; combination of the three
city-based (Aberdeen, Edinburgh, and Glasgow) societies formed
in Scotland in the 19th century to create the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS) in 1951; and the merger of
the London Association of Accountants and the Corporation of
Accountants in Scotland to form, in 1939, what is today known
as the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants [Edwards,
2003]. The only other major reorganization of the British accounting profession occurred in 1957 when the second largest
accountancy body in Britain, the Society of Incorporated Accountants and Auditors, was dissolved with its members joining
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss2/2
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one or other of the then three chartered bodies.
There has been no further merger involving any of the
senior professional bodies in Britain for half a century, during
which time many initiatives have in fact been mounted only
to have then foundered. The first of these marked an event
which serves as the focal point for this study – the “disaster”
[Accountancy, September 1970, p. 637] that occurred when the
ICAEW’s membership rejected its leadership’s plan to merge
all six senior accountancy bodies in 1970. Subsequent aborted
merger plans include the ICAS with the ICAEW in 1989, the
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA)
with the ICAEW in 1990 and 2005, and the Chartered Institute
of Management Accountants with the ICAEW in 1996 and 2004.
The reasons for failure are seen to be broadly common, “internal
wrangling and fiercely guarded brand values” [Perry, 2004].1
Every time a proposed merger fails, division between the
ICAEW Council and its membership is highlighted [Wild, 2005],
the authority of Council is problematized, and more representative arrangements in the Council’s composition are demanded.
For example, a letter published in Accountancy [July 1996, p.
130] stated that:
Elected but out of touch…Not only is there no means
by which the elected Council members do receive the
views of their constituents, but their behavior in recent
years has shown them to be seriously out of touch with
members’ wishes. The issue of merger, for example, has
shown time and time again that the Council members
did not know, or chose to ignore, the view of their constituents.
The purposes of this study are to explain why the ICAEW
Council came to be “detached” from the interests of the membership, lost its authority with the membership, and subsequently failed to re-establish it. To achieve these objectives, the
remainder of this paper is constructed in the following manner.
First, we locate our study within the relevant prior accounting
history literature. Next, we review germane features of the politi
cal theory of organization to establish an analytical framework
for examining the intra-organizational dynamics between different groups of members within the ICAEW. We then consider
whether the ICAEW’s internal regulations succeeded in making
provision for a democratically run organization and identify
1
See also, “Membership ‘Time Bomb’ Drives ICAEW Merger Plan” [2004] and
“Members Split on ICAEW-CIMA-CIPFA Merger” [2004].
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and distinguish types of criticisms directed in practice at the
representative character of the leadership by members and the
professional press. In so doing, and by reference to the analytical framework, we trace and analyze the reform of the arrangements made for the election of ICAEW councilors during the
period prior to 1970, and consider their effectiveness. We then
examine the reasons for the collapse of the scheme for integrating the entire British accountancy profession, drawing attention
to and presenting evidence to demonstrate the “detachment of
office bearers from their constituents” [Shackleton and Walker,
2001, p. 277]. Finally, we examine and analyze the failure of numerous attempts to restore the Council’s authority over a period
approaching four decades since that calamity occurred.
The main primary sources consulted for the purpose of
this study are located at the Guildhall Library, London, and the
ICAEW’s office in Milton Keynes.
INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS IN
ACCOUNTING HISTORY
There exists a substantial critical literature on the professionalization of accountancy which is marked by studies of
closure strategies2 pursued by professional accountancy bodies.
Many of the works of this genre focus on external relationships –
inter-organizational, inter-occupational, and, particularly, stateprofession – in the endeavor to offer a “coherent explanation
of why some occupations [or segments] successfully become
accepted as professionalized whilst others do not” [Cooper and
Robson, 1990, p. 374]. There is also a developing literature that
spotlights the significance of intra-organizational relationships
within an accountancy body, focusing, in the main, on dichotomies between the leadership and the rank-and-file.
Extending work on closure strategies, one strand of the
studies of internal relationships examines the interface between
the accounting profession and the state. Chua and Poullaos
[1993] include an examination of the need to address the concerns of practitioners and non-practitioners when Victorian accountants were attempting to secure state recognition by royal
charter between 1885 and 1906. Carnegie et al. [2003] employ
the prosopograhical method of inquiry to explain why key
members of the Incorporated Institute of Accountants, Victoria,
2
Murphy [1984, p. 548] defines closure as “the process of mobilizing power in
order to enhance or defend a group’s share of rewards or resources.”
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transferred their allegiance to the Australasian Corporation of
Public Accountants in order to better pursue acquisition of a
charter for those in public practice. Richardson’s [1989, p. 415]
study of the regulation of accountancy “illustrates the relationship between the internal social order of the profession and its
involvement in corporatist structures in one particular jurisdiction,” that of Ontario, Canada. He draws on Gramsci’s theory
of hegemony to examine the way in which consent was manufactured and dissent managed during creation of the Public Accountants Council. Shackleton’s [1995, p. 40] study of Scottish
chartered accountants up to World War I reveals “significant
schisms” within the membership of the dominant Society of
Accountants in Edinburgh that problematized relationships
with the state over the period 1853-1916. Noguchi and Edwards’
[2004a] study of the ICAEW leadership’s determination to ensure
that its 1944 submission to the Cohen Committee on Company
Law Amendment was consistent with state priorities resulted in
rejection of unwelcome proposals put forward by district societies and refusal of requests to make independent submissions.
Noguchi and Edwards [2004b] reveal disagreement between
practicing and industrial members concerning how to tackle the
pressing issue of inflation accounting between 1948 and 1966,
and demonstrate how the Council of the ICAEW resolved this
internal conflict within the constraints imposed by the need to
be seen to behave in the “public interest.”
A second type of intra-organizational investigation focuses
on the interaction between the leadership and the membership
of an accountancy body over contentious issues such as merger
with other professional associations. Often, a key concern of the
members is the loss of product branding which is deemed to be
an important part of members’ identity in the marketplace and,
therefore, “infused with value” [Richardson and Jones, 2007,
pp. 135-136]. Richardson and Jones show the process through
which the 2004 proposed merger between the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants and CMA Canada failed, “largely
because of the reaction of members of each association to either the potential loss of their designation [in order to join the
merged body] or the dilution of their ‘brand’ equity [by granting
the continuing designation to new members through the merger
rather than through traditional entry processes].” In the U.S.,
the AICPA’s global credential initiative was put to a vote, in
January 2002, which “revealed a startling disconnect between
the elite of the profession and the members in whose name they
claimed to work” [Fogarty et al., 2006, p.16; see also, Shafer
Published by eGrove, 2008
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and Gendron, 2005]. Within the British context, Shackleton and
Walker’s [2001, p. 235] study of the period 1957-1970 explains
how Henry Benson’s early (1966) acknowledgment of the fact
that the merger “proposals would initially involve dilution and,
therefore, a reduction in status as a starting point” proved too
bitter a pill for ICAEW members to swallow.
Following the second line of investigation, this study
conducts a theoretically informed analysis of conflict of interest between different groups of the membership arising from
the constitutional arrangements made for the election of the
ICAEW’s Council. In the next section, we review relevant aspects
of the political theory of organization to establish the analytical
framework for this study.
POLITICAL THEORY OF ORGANIZATION
Building on Max Weber’s thesis on bureaucracy, Michels
[1962, p. 365] formulated a political theory called “the iron
law of oligarchy” in his book Political Parties, first published in
1911. “Whoever says organization, says oligarchy,” he argued,
on the grounds that all forms of organization, as the inevitable
outcome of their growth, eventually develop into an oligarchic
polity despite the continued existence of formal democratic
practices. Jenkins [1977, p. 569] called this facet of Michels’ iron
law the “organizational transformation” thesis. Scott [2003, p.
343] agrees that “most unions, most professional associations
and other types of voluntary associations, and most political
parties exhibit oligarchical leadership structures.”
Emergence of Oligarchy: Following Cassinelli [1953], Jenkins
[1977, p. 571] defines oligarchy as “the ability of a minority in an
organization, generally the formal leadership, to make decisions
free of controls exercised by the remainder of the organization,
generally the membership,” and further explains: “For a voluntary organization officially committed to pursuing the interests
of members…oligarchy means that the policies of the organization reflect the preferences of elites rather than the views and
interests of its members.”3
Oligarchy emerges because leaders of the organization wish
to maintain their place on the ruling body and “because the positions provide them with economic rewards and social status”
3
Leach [2005, p. 316] stated that “oligarchy is best understood as a particular
distribution of illegitimate power that has become entrenched over time.”
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[Osterman, 2006, p. 623]. Once leaders are appointed, they use
their position to maintain, or if possible enhance, their power or
attendant prestige by controlling the flow of information within
the organization and mobilizing their political and organi
zational resources, with the result that the rank-and-file of the
organization are deprived of opportunities to exercise its own
power to challenge the leadership [Lipset et al., 1956]. According to Jenkins [1977, p. 569]:
As the organization experiences membership increase,
the ability of members to participate directly in the
making of policy is curtailed. The members may retain
formal control through the election of officers. How
ever, growth also entails installation of centralized
means of communication and formalized procedures.
Both of these factors insulate officers from controls by
members despite the check of periodic elections. Officers can use centralized communications to control
the agenda of issues and can block challenges through
formal procedures and administrative co-optation.
Importantly, the leaders have the power to co-opt junior
officials who share their values and orientation, with the result
that the oligarchy becomes self-perpetuating.
Subsequent Development of Political Theory: Empirical and
theoretical studies that followed the Weber-Michels model of
organization elaborated it along three main lines – an explication of the sources, dynamics, and consequences of the “iron
law”; an empirical testing of the model; and “an examination of
contingent circumstances in which the iron law does not take
hold or when it is reversed” [Osterman, 2006, p. 622]. The third
line is particularly significant because it amends the model’s
universality by arguing that the advent of oligarchy is not inevitable, as Michels claimed, but contingent on a particular set of
conditions.
The case for the contingent nature of oligarchy was persuasively presented by Zald and Ash [1966, pp. 328, 340], who
criticized the Weber-Michels model as ignoring environmental
factors surrounding organizations and insisted that “the WeberMichels model can be subsumed under a more general approach…which specifies the condition under which alternative
transformation processes take place.” They examined various
conditional terms, both internal and external (including interaction with other organizations), and concluded that there is no
evidence confirming the inevitable advent of oligarchy.
Published by eGrove, 2008
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The argument of Zald and Ash [1966] encouraged subsequent empirical studies of the contingent nature of oligarchy.
Jenkins [1977, p. 570], drawing on the results of Edelstein and
Warner [1976] and Rothschild-Whitt [1976], argued that the
advent of oligarchy depends upon such factors as absence of
influential factions, weak procedural guarantees in competitive
elections, and differences in ideological commitments between
elite and general members. Other studies identify the following
additional conditions that influence whether oligarchy emerges
– characteristics and social status of the organization’s members
[Lipset et al., 1956; Clemens, 1993], decision-making structure,
characteristics of the leadership, and age of the organization
[Staggenborg, 1988; Minkoff, 1999].
Germane to this study, the question of how organizations
can reverse or break away from an oligarchic situation has also
been actively researched [Osterman, 2006, p. 625]. Voss and
Sherman [2000, p. 304] examined the revitalization process of
the American labor movement that had suffered “the entrenched
leadership and conservative transformation associated with
Michels’s iron law of oligarchy,” while Isaac and Christiansen
[2002] depicted the process of how workplace labor militancy
was revitalized by civil rights movement insurgencies and
organization. The most widely recognized phenomenon caused
by oligarchy is loss of commitment and energy on the part of the
membership, which Zald and Ash [1966, p. 334] called “becalming.” Piven and Cloward [1977] described how membership’s energy is lost when an organization for a poor peoples’ movement
becomes bureaucratized, while Voss and Sherman [2000] revealed that the decline of the labor union movement was caused
by the loss of membership commitment. In the context of the
labor union movement, Voss and Sherman [2000, pp. 304-305,
309] identified three pre-conditions for overcoming oligarchic
symptoms and restoring organizational vitality:
First, some local unions experienced an internal political crisis that fostered the entry of new leadership,
either through international union intervention or
local elections. Second, these new leaders had activist
experience in other social movements, which led them
to interpret labor’s decline as a mandate to organize
and gave them the skills and vision to implement new
organizing programs using disruptive tactics. Finally,
international unions with leaders committed to organizing in new ways facilitated the entry of these activists
into locals and provided locals with the resources and
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss2/2
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legitimacy to make change that facilitated the process
of organizational transformation.
Voss and Sherman further suggest potential for their findings
to be applicable to other organizations by stating that the factors identified “provide a useful template with which to examine
other institutionalized organizations that innovate in a radical
direction or fail to do so.”4 Among the factors Voss and Sherman
identified, political crisis within the organization5 and an influx
of new leaders to wield influence, are of importance to this
study.
We can therefore conclude that the political theory of organization is a promising basis for analyzing the problematic
leadership of the ICAEW because the theory postulates that all
leaderships have the potential to become oligarchic as they
grow; the theory is applicable to voluntary associations such as
professional bodies; the theory suggests that the leadership’s determination to maintain control causes them to pursue policies
that are in their interests rather than those of the general membership; and growth in size and the development of organizational structures limit the members’ power to influence/control
the leadership. But the theory also acknowledges the fact that
oligarchy is not inevitable; it depends on internal conditions and
can be overcome in appropriate environmental circumstances.
CONSTRUCTING A DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED COUNCIL
The organizational structure of the ICAEW consists of the
Council and a variety of sub-systems which include district societies and numerous Council-appointed committees. The Royal
Charter (1880) gave Council responsibility for the management
and superintendence of the Institute’s affairs and, as “the policymaking body,” it has reigned over the ICAEW throughout its history. Given the purpose of this paper, it is necessary to consider
whether the ICAEW’s internal regulations match the theoretical
characteristics of a democratically created organization.
According to Merton [1966, pp. 1057-1058], “The democratic organization provides for an inclusive electorate of members

4
Voss and Sherman [2000, p. 345] added that “the elements of crisis, new
leaders with novel interpretations, and centralized pressure are likely to be key.”
5
Voss and Sherman [2000, pp. 327, 343] identified disastrous strikes and mismanagement of the local union as examples of political crises and concluded:
“These crises were important primarily because they resulted in a change in leadership” and that “radical changes necessitate new leadership.”
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and for regularly scheduled elections.” Merton adds: “The democratic organization must provide for initiatives of policy to come
from elected representatives and to be evaluated by the membership through recurrent elections of representatives.” Thus,
In one form or another, a democracy must provide for
a legislative body: a Congress, a Parliament, or a House
of Delegates…It is, therefore, all the more important
that a voluntary association’s legislative body, which
usually represents the near-ultimate authority of the association, be representative of the diverse interests and
values of the entire membership.
The ICAEW’s Royal Charter provided that the power of the
Council should be subject to the control and regulation of special and annual general meetings (AGMs). The original by-laws
provided for the Council to consist of 45 members of whom the
nine longest serving were required to retire each year and were
eligible for re-election. Filling a vacancy on the Council required
formal approval at an AGM. Provision was made for additional
candidates to be nominated in writing by ten members. In the
event of a vacancy occurring between AGMs, the Council was
empowered to appoint a replacement who would retire and be
eligible for re-election on the same date as the person replaced.
At meetings of the ICAEW, members had equal voting rights
and, therefore, were able to make their voices heard and views
reflected in the organization’s affairs, either directly through the
approval of major decisions taken by the Council (e.g., proposals to reform the by-laws) or indirectly through the elections of
councilors.
CRITICISM OF LEADERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS
The previous section reveals that the policy formulation
and decision-making criteria for a democratically run organization were formally satisfied in the case of the ICAEW, and one
might therefore expect the legislative body, the Council, to be
“representative of the diverse interests and values of the entire
membership” [Merton, 1966, p. 1058]. In practice, the Council
was, from very early on, judged by both the membership and the
accounting press to consist instead of self-perpetuating elites.
There were four inter-related elements in the criticism of how
the ICAEW’s leadership was constituted in practice – over-representation of leading firms, unbalanced geographical representation, biased re-election arrangements, and non-representation of
business members.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss2/2
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Over-Representation of Leading Firms: The ICAEW’s first Council
included five cases of two members coming from a single accounting firm.6 Apart from Thomas, Wade, Guthrie & Co., these
were all London partnerships. The author of the ICAEW’s official
history, himself a former president, records that criticism of this
feature of the Council’s composition was aired early on [Howitt,
1966, p. 28]:
It was advanced that the affairs of the Institute were being handled by too small and privileged a circle, and at
the second Annual General Meeting in 1883 a motion
was proposed to prevent any firm of accountants from
being represented by more than one member on the
Council…The question remained a contentious one.
The Council’s response was that this arrangement had been
given “the most grave consideration…at the foundation of the
Institute” [Accountant, May 5, 1883, p. 13] but allowed to stand.
Indeed, it had been created because of the desire to present a
strong public profile. According to councilor C.F. Kemp, citing the example of representations made to the government
concerning the Bankruptcy Bill 1883, “it was necessary to bring
the greatest possible influence they could obtain to bear, and…
without the recognised names which they possessed they [the
ICAEW] would not be in the position which they now occupied”
[Accountant, May 5, 1883, p. 11]. However, to prevent any further extension of the representation of leading firms, it became
an “unwritten rule” that “not more than two partners in the
same firm should serve on the Council at the same time” [Council Minute Book Y, p. 4; File 1490].7
Geographical Representation: The ICAEW was originally formed
from the amalgamation of five societies, of which four primarily catered for public accountants working in the cities where
they were formed – Liverpool, London, Manchester, and Shef-

6
E. Guthrie and C.H. Wade from Thomas, Wade, Guthrie & Co.; R.P. Harding
and F. Whinney from Harding, Whinney & Co.; A.C. Harper and E.N. Harper from
E. Norton Harper & Sons; W. Turquand and J. Young from Turquand, Youngs &
Co.; and W.W. Deloitte and J.G. Griffiths from Deloitte, Dever, Griffiths & Co.
7
This rule was abandoned in 1966 because “it could prohibit members who
could give valuable service to the Institute as members of the Council from being
appointed to the Council” [Council Minute Book Y, p. 42]. From that date, Council
adopted a “rule of guidance” that “not more than three members in direct partnership relationship may serve concurrently as members of the Council” [Council
Minute Book Z, p. 92].

Published by eGrove, 2008

11

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 35 [2008], Iss. 2, Art. 2
12

Accounting Historians Journal, December 2008

field. The inaugural 45 Council seats were, with two exceptions,8
allocated between the founding associations [Howitt, 1966,
p. 24]9 and, therefore, were inevitably heavily biased in favor
of those geographical areas. The geographical distribution of
Council membership was questioned at the very first AGM held
on June 7, 1882, when A. Murray suggested that “Such towns as
Newcastle and Bristol should be represented” [Accountant, June
10, 1882, p. 10]. G.B. Monkhouse, Newcastle upon Tyne, and
E.G. Clarke, Bristol, were appointed to the Council later that
year, and the 1883 AGM was informed that Council had been
“strengthened” by the election of these “eminent accountants
from districts hitherto unrepresented” [Accountant, May 5, 1883,
p. 13].
The ICAEW’s leadership did not immediately embrace enthusiastically the notion of geographical equality, however, with
the General Purposes Committee (GPC) deciding in July 1888
that “it is not desirable to go into statistics of membership with a
view to redistribution of the members of the Council among the
various districts in proportion to the members of the Institute
residing in those districts” [Ms.28416/1, p. 97]. Within a decade,
we detect a softening of the GPC’s stance when recommending
in October 1897 that south Wales be represented for the first
time on the Council through the appointment of R.G. Cawker
[Ms.28416/2, pp. 10, 15]. Council again remained unmoved, but
gradually responded to pressure for provincial representation so
that, by 1901, a revised quota system had been instituted. Of the
45 available places, 12 were allocated to the four existing socie
ties (Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester, and Northern) and
a further eight to major cities. The remaining 25 places were
reserved for London members.
The opening move to improve further provincial representation occurred at the 1901 AGM when W.R. Hamilton of Nottingham complained of “the over-representation of London” and
requested the Council to take steps designed to achieve representation on the Council “in some measure corresponding to the
[geographical] distribution of accountants” [Accountant, May 4,
1901, pp. 534-535]. This plea met with a stonewalling response
8
Through effective political manoeuvring [Walker, 2004, chapter 11], Edwin
Guthrie and Charles Henry Wade, who belonged to none of the five merging institutions, were not only admitted as founder members but were also allocated
seats on the Council.
9
Of 45 Council seats, 20 were allocated to the Institute of Accountants, 14 to
the Society of Accountants, three to the Manchester Institute (in addition to Wade
and Guthrie), and three each to the Liverpool Society and the Sheffield Institute.
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from Ernest Cooper, president 1899-1901, who insisted that “all
they [the Council] desired was the best possible process of getting the best possible men on the Council” [Accountant, May 4,
1901, p. 536], further explaining that the role of the quota system was to help maintain “a fair proportion between the country
members and the London members.” If, instead, the matter was
left to the general body of members, Cooper believed that the
inevitable result would be “to elect far more London men than
at present, because the great body would be in London” [Accountant, May 4, 1901, pp. 536-537].10
Continued and persistent complaints from provincial
members eventually produced positive results, with the grant of
Council representation often appearing to follow as a reward for
forming a local society.11 A wider degree of provincial members’
representation on Council was therefore achieved, with the selection of members being made by the Council based on nominations from provincial societies. However, wider representation
for the provinces did not necessarily mean increased representation. By 1950, 13 provincial societies had been created, and the
number of Council members assigned to them was 21, only one
seat more than the 1901 allocation. The majority (24) of Council
seats continued to be assigned to London members.
Re-election Arrangements: There were a number of features of
the re-election arrangements which were thought to have perpetuated control by elites on the Council and to have made it
difficult to counter its biased composition both in terms of geography and the favoritism accorded the leading firms.
Those retiring by rotation were routinely re-elected, causing
a contributor to The Accountant to complain that “the Council is
not representative as it should be by the Bye-laws of the Charter.
For the last nineteen years (I think without a single exception)
the Council have re-elected themselves!” [Accountant, June 9,
1900, p. 533]. Criticisms were also directed, persistently and
vehemently, at the practice of the Council filling vacancies that
arose between annual meetings, an action which, it was felt, de10
The dissatisfaction among Nottingham members was settled in 1907,
when T.G. Mellors of Mellors, Basden & Mellors, Nottingham was appointed to
the Council. The Accountant [December 14, 1907, p. 726] reported that “The appointment is an excellent one in every way; but perhaps especially so because it
removes a grievance under which Nottingham has been suffering for some years
past.”
11
Nottingham (1907), South Wales (1913), Leicester (1930), South Eastern
Society (1939), East Anglian Society (1939)
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prived the membership from having its say at the next AGM: “If
a councillor dies or retires a Mr. Brown or a Mr. Jones is given
the situation, and the members who annually retire by rotation
are re-elected nem. con” [Accountant, June 9, 1900, p. 533].12
The issue was raised at the 1901 AGM when Hamilton referred
“to the very old grievance of the filling-up of vacancies occurring
in the Council during the year by the Council, instead of leaving
those vacancies to be filled up by the members” [Accountant,
May 4, 1901, p. 534]. Proposals that casual vacancies should
be left unfilled until the next AGM, made at Council meetings
by such luminaries as Frederick Whinney in 1882 and George
Walter Knox in 1885, met with no success [Ms.28411/1, pp. 167,
402; see also, Ms.28411/2, p. 300; Ms.28416/1, p. 97]. Indeed, on
October 14, 1896, Council explicitly resolved “not to make any
departure from the existing practice” of filling casual vacancies
[Ms.28411/4, p. 115].
It could well be argued that the members literally had the
solution in their own hands, but that they failed to exercise it.
A supplementary report of the GPC, dated February 26, 1919,
stated that “there has been no notice nominating candidates in
opposition to retiring members of the Council for the last 32
years” [Ms.28435/16]. Nor has our examination of the available
archival data revealed a single instance of retirement by rotation
leading to a change in Council membership. The Accountant
[May 5, 1894, p. 408] makes the reasonable point that it was
“a very invidious task for the ordinary members to object to
persons who had once been elected.” But members’ inaction
enabled the Council to respond to criticism as follows: “On one
occasion a vote was taken, so that the rules of procedure did not
prevent the introduction of anybody;13 or at any rate the testing
of the feeling of the members in regard to any person who might
be put forward” [Accountant, May 5, 1894, p. 408; see also, May
9, 1896, p. 396].14
The issue of Council control over new appointments also
had a more general dimension. When a member of a provincial
12
See also, Accountant, May 13, 1893, p. 453; May 5, 1894, p. 408; May 12,
1894, p. 423; May 12, 1894, pp. 424-425; December 21, 1895, p. 1031; May 9, 1896,
p. 396; June 23, 1900, p. 573; March 18, 1901, p. 327.
13
This justification was somewhat disingenuous given that the vote took place
only because of Council’s failure, due to an oversight, to fill a vacancy created by
a member’s sudden resignation.
14
The case referred to was probably the only instance we have found of an
election taking place, resulting in the appointment to Council of F.H. Collison,
London, in May 1887 [Accountant, May 2, 1887, p. 271].
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society retired, the society had the right to put forward nominations for his replacement, but the Council reserved the power to
choose between the nominees. The position was even worse in
London where the appointment remained entirely in the hands
of the London Council members. The autocratic nature of this
prerogative is further underlined by the fact that the London
members of the Council maintained, from 1899 onwards, “waiting lists” of prospective councilors “in order to ensure continuity
in the work of the Council and the maintenance of its traditions”
[Ms.28435/16, emphasis added].
It was mainly to address this latter situation that, in July
1920, a group of younger London members pressed for the
creation of “a Society of Chartered Accountants for London on
lines similar to the existing Provincial Societies…to act together
in a corporate capacity upon questions which arise from time to
time affecting the interests of the profession” [Accountant, July
17, 1920, p. 58; see also, Loft, 1990, p. 39]. To appear to respond
positively to the London members’ concerns, the Council established instead the London Members’ Committee. This arrangement failed to satisfy the London members’ principal aspiration
which was to achieve “the privilege,” in common with provincial
societies, of “nominating men to fill vacancies on the Council
as and when such vacancies should arise for London men” [Accountant, January 29, 1921, pp. 121-122]. The London Members’
Committee was, in the estimation of The Accountant [January
29, 1921, pp. 121-122; see also, London Members’ Committee
Minutes Book A, p. 4], designed only to facilitate social intercourse among London members.
It was to be a further 21 years (1942) before the anomaly
was addressed and, even then, the London Members’ Committee
(by this time called the London & District Society) was authorized to make nominations to Council for filling a vacancy only
after consultation with the London members of the Council.
The surviving records of recommendations made by London
councilors and the nominations subsequently transmitted to
the Council by the committee of the London & District Society
prove fairly conclusively that the views of London councilors
dominated the appointment process [London Members’ Committee Minutes Books B, p. 188; C, pp. 7, 108, 177, 200, 245,
263; London & District Society Minutes Books D, pp. 74, 155,
158; E, p. 3].
A final objectionable feature of re-election arrangements
was the subject of a leading article in The Accountant [May 21,
1904, p. 669; see also, Accountant, July 9, 1904, p. 41]: “Council
Published by eGrove, 2008
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…hold office…by a sort of ‘apostolic succession’ from the original Fathers of the Institute, and in no real sense have the general
body of members had a voice in either their nomination or election.” Apostolic succession meant that councilors, on death or
resignation, would be replaced by another partner in the same
firm, and this sometimes would literally involve a son succeeding his father in that role. For example, in 1897, when Council
rejected the request for south Wales representation, it instead
appointed E. Edmonds in place of W. Edmonds of Portsmouth.
Personal correspondence, dated November 29, 1925 from J. B.
Woodthorpe to Sir William Henry Peat, a London councilor,
concerning the death of John William Woodthorpe, also demonstrates this version of apostolic succession: “I believe there are
several precedents of a son succeeding his father on the Council,
and, if this should happen in the present case, I should esteem
it was a very great honour” [Ms.28435/16]. More often there
would be no family connection, with a prominent example from
this genre occurring when Samuel Lowell Price was succeeded
by his founder partner Edwin Waterhouse in 1887. Overall, we
can therefore conclude that in 1942 and beyond, the Council
retained, substantively, the character of a self-elected body.
A final feature of the non-representative composition of the
Council concerns the complete exclusion throughout the first 60
or so years of the ICAEW’s history of any representation whatsoever of business members. It is to this issue that we now turn.
Business Members: At the 1919 AGM, Mark Webster Jenkinson,
a London practitioner, argued that “there is a very strong feeling
among the members, particularly among the younger members,
that some more progressive policy on the part of the Institute
itself is necessary” [Accountant, May 10, 1919, pp. 398-399].15
As the result of his work as controller of factory audit and costs
at the Ministry of Munitions during World War I, Jenkinson
had reached the conclusion that cost accounting was an area
of growing importance, that chartered accountants knew less
than they should about it and that, if they failed to “deliver the
goods,” a new profession would spring up to fill the vacuum
[Accountant, January 18, 1919, p. 46]. Jenkinson’s wide-ranging
15
The Accountant [January 25, 1919, p. 54] reported on Jenkinson’s proposals
as follows: “there can…be very little doubt that they will meet with very widespread support among the members of the Institute, and particularly the younger
members, especially when put forward by so undoubtable a champion of the
younger generation’s rights as Mr. Webster Jenkinson.”
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proposals for reform included a system of proportional representation to ensure fair treatment of each geographical district
and, significantly, in light of his deep-seated concern about the
appropriate future direction of the Institute, three councilors
drawn from the non-practicing membership [Accountant, January 25, 1919, p. 54; Ms.28448].
Frederick John Young, president 1917-1919, responded by
creating a committee to consider the subject consisting of ten
members of the Council, nine representatives from each of the
provincial societies, and two other London members of the Institute [Accountant, May 10, 1919, p. 398]. A confidential letter,
dated April 3, 1919, from R.H. March, a Cardiff councilor, to
George Colville, secretary of the ICAEW, reveals that the Special Committee was formed principally to pacify dissatisfaction
among members [Ms.28448]:
the Council should not oppose any wishes which might
be put forward by the general body of members for the
consideration of this subject, and should be willing to
listen to any suggestions which may be put forward for
the welfare of the profession…if a little tact is shown
now it may have the effect of preventing any show of
irritation or temper at the Annual Meeting.
Given these sentiments and Council’s domination of the investigating committee, it is unsurprising that its report made no
provision for non-practitioner representation on the Council. It
did put forward certain recommendations, one of which might
have proved significant in addressing Jenkinson’s concerns [Accountant, February 7, 1920, p. 152; Ms.28448]:
(E) That the present procedure of the Council under
which the Provincial Societies are consulted with regard to the filling of casual vacancies of the Council under Bye-law 10 be continued when such vacancy arises,
and that as far as may be the representation of the Provincial Societies on the Council should be proportionate
to the total membership in England and Wales.
The Council endorsed the other recommendations without
qualification, but specifically emphasized that “The present procedure as defined by the Committee under ‘E’ will be continued
by the Council” [Accountant, February 7, 1920, p. 152, emphasis
added; Ms.28448].
The issue of business members’ representation resurfaced
as the numbers employed in industry and commerce became
Published by eGrove, 2008
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more substantial. Table 1 reveals that around the time of Jenkinson’s intervention on behalf of business members, just 5% (191
of 3,797) of the traceable membership worked in business. The
position then changed dramatically. The number of business
members roughly trebled in both the 1920s and 1930s and accounted for 17.2% (1,612 of 9,349) of the traceable membership
in England and Wales in 1939.
TABLE 1
Categorized Membership of the ICAEW in
England and Wales in Selected Years
Members
31/08/1920 01/09/1929 31/10/1939 09/11/1946 01/12/1956
Public accountants
3,606
5,755
7,737
6,840
9,161
Business accountants
191
518
1,612
2,493
4,337
Total traceable
3,797
6,273
9,349
9,333
13,498
995
1,444
2,838
2,854
3,409
Not traceable16
Retired
415
Total
4,792
7,717
12,187
12,187
17,322
Source: Membership Lists for 1921, 1930, 1940, 1947, 1957.16

E.M. Taylor who, like Jenkinson, had stressed the growing
importance of cost accounting in the aftermath of World War I
[Accountant, June 19, 1920, p. 712], presented to the 1941 AGM
the following resolution designed to address the absence of
representation of the rising number of business members [Ms.
28432/19, emphasis added]:
In the interests of the whole membership of the Institute, it is desirable that the Council shall include not
less than five Associates, whether practising members or
not, and that the members of the Council be invited to
lay before the next Annual General Meeting of the Institute proposals to give effect to this policy.
The Council instead introduced reforms that failed to address directly the matter at issue. C.J.G. Palmour, president
1938-1944, informed the 1942 AGM that non-practicing members could “best serve the interests of those by whom they are
16
Members for whom the listings contain, at best, private addresses are included in the “Not traceable” category. The numbers of “Retired” members are not
separately identified between 1920 and 1946 and, accordingly, are also included
in “Not traceable” category. The proportion of “Not traceable,” when compared
with the other categories, is stable at around 21.7%. Thus, the trend revealed by
the statistics is considered to be a reasonably reliable indication of the increase in
number of business members.
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employed and the country generally in taking an active part
in those [technical] spheres rather than in attempting to apply
their minds to matters affecting the administration of the affairs
of practising accountants” [Accountant, May 30, 1942, p. 303].
The outcome was the formation of the path-breaking Taxation
and Financial Relations Committee [Zeff, 1972, p. 8] to investigate technical matters and, through its mixed membership, “establish an active and effective liaison between the practising and
non-practising sides of the profession” [Ms.28432/19].
The Council’s success in again sidelining the representation
issue, as occurred with the formation of the London Members’
Committee in 1920, was short-lived this time. The Council’s attitude towards the representation of business members was at
last softening, possibly because of the rapidly rising proportion
of business members, and perhaps in recognition of business
members’ valuable contributions to the work of the Taxation
and Financial Relations Committee. Between 1943 and 1948, the
London and Manchester district societies successfully nominated four business members for positions on the Council. The situation was extended and formalized at the 1950 AGM when the
president, Russell Kettle of Deloittes, announced the creation of
a pool of up to five Council seats17 exclusively available to nonpracticing members. But he also reaffirmed “the principle” that
“having regard to the objects for which the Royal Charter was
granted, membership of the Council should as a general rule be
confined to practising members” [Accountant, May 13, 1950, pp.
541-542].
Continued pressure for a greater voice for business members bore further fruit through the formation of a GPC SubCommittee (Non-Practising Members) in 1951 and the Consultative Committee of Members in Commerce and Industry in 1957
to consider matters relating to the interests of business members [GPC Minutes Book J, p. 180] and to convey “broad and
exclusively non-practising opinion held by persons of eminence
in industry and commerce” [GPC Minutes Book M, p. 175]. In
the view of business members such as J. Clayton, however, the
formation of such a committee was not the most effective means
for improving the representation of the interest of business
members. He argued [File 5-8-14] that:
what was needed was proper integration of the two
[practising and non-practising] sides of the profession
18
As a consequence, the quota allocated to provincial societies was reduced
from 21 to 19 and London from 24 to 21.
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and this could only be done by opening the Council
to more non-practising members. Industrial opinion
would then be properly assimilated at all levels and in
all Committees.
The Consultative Committee of Members in Commerce and
Industry resolved in October 1962 that the GPC should be asked
to support an increase in the size of the Council from 45 to
60, with 15 seats to be allocated to members in commerce and
industry [GPC Minutes Book R, p. 137]. Also, to help achieve
“the right balance of sound judgment and experience on the one
hand and special skills necessary to conduct the wide range of
its work on the other” [GPC Minutes Book R, pp. 135-136], GPC
recommended the introduction of a system of co-option of up to
six additional members as “a reserve to be filled at the absolute
discretion of the Council” [GPC Minutes Book S, p. 60]. These
proposals were approved by a special general meeting of the
ICAEW membership held on September 23, 1965 [Council Minutes Book W, p. 154]. As a result of seat re-allocations, the balance between practitioners in London and the provinces favored
the latter for the first time in the history of the ICAEW, 24 seats
compared with 21.
The above four inter-related criticisms, sustained over
the period 1880-1970 and directed at the Council’s lack of fair
representation of the membership, raise serious doubts over
whether the democratic leadership arrangements contained
in the ICAEW’s internal regulations were effective in practice.
Certainly, many members thought the Council was not representative of the diverse interests of the membership, but were their
criticisms justified? The next sub-section addresses this issue in
three ways; namely, by examining the geographical allocation of
council seats in relation to membership levels, the distribution
of council seats in relation to the size and location of accounting
firms, and the division of seats between accountants working in
public practice and in business.
Analysis of Distribution of Council Seats: Over the period 18801970, 308 individuals, including the founder councilors, were
appointed to the Council [Ms.28411/1-14; Council Minutes
Books O-AB], of whom 29 were members in industry and ten,
including two further business accountants, were recruited
when the Society of Incorporated Accountants and Auditors was
absorbed into the three chartered institutes in 1957. The remaining 269 were practicing members.
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Numerical information concerning the membership of each
of the main district societies and the number of Council seats
allocated to the geographical areas that they covered at five different dates between 1907 and 1956 is given in Table 2. It reveals
that London members were consistently over-represented on the
Council, based on their share of total U.K. membership in comparison with most provincial societies at most dates. The overrepresentation was greatest in 1907, but still material in 1956
when each of the other identified geographical areas continued
to be under-represented. As noted above, the number of seats
allocated to the provincial districts exceeded those for London
for the first time in 1965, with the result that London’s share fell
from 52.5% to 46.7%. Even then, London members remained
heavily over-represented as their contribution towards the total
U.K. membership had declined to 37.5% by 1972 [Council Minutes Book AF, p. 231].18
To study allegations that Council membership was dominated by a limited number of large, long-standing London firms,
we have identified those which either had a member on the first
Council of the ICAEW or were formed 15 years or more prior
to 1880 [Boys, 1994, pp. 17-18, 56-58; see also, Parker, 1980,
pp. 36, 39-42; Matthews et al., 1998, pp. 283-322]. This exercise
produced a list of 30 London “founder” firms. The numbers of
Council seats occupied by partners in these firms and qualified accountants employed at these firms at five dates between
1920 and 1956 are given in Table 3.19 Corresponding figures also
appear in Table 3 for “other London firms” and “non-London
firms” in England and Wales. We have applied the chi-square
test to examine the statistical significance, if any, of the difference in levels of Council representation at each of the five dates
between London founder firms and the other two groups. At the
first two study dates (1920 and 1929), the results were significant at the 5% level, given there is only one degree of freedom.
For 1939, the test proved significant at the 10% level. For 1946
and 1956, the results were significant at neither the 5% nor 10%
18
The officially recorded justification for London’s preferment in terms of
Council seats was the distance between many provincial areas and London where
the meetings of the Council and its committees were held [Council Minutes Book
O, p. 227; File 1487].
19
From the Companies Act 1862 to the Companies Act 1967, there existed a
provision prohibiting, in principle, partnerships of more than 20 members. The
number of qualified accountants employed in accountancy firms, rather than the
number of partners, is therefore considered to be a better indication of the size of
the accountancy firm.
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TABLE 2

2

no.
3.4%

4.4%

%

3

176

3

no.

7.3%

6.7%

5.1%

6.7%

%

507

5

324

5

no.

12.0%

11.1%

9.3%

11.1%

%

1,948

26

1,464

27

no.

46.3%

57.8%

42.1%

60.0%

%

858

6

1,138

5

no.

20.4%

13.3%

32.7%

11.1%

%

4,211

45

3,479

45

no.

100%

100%

100%

100%

%

All societies

%
118

306

Other

6.7%

5.2%

4.4%

London

Membership of District Societies and Number of Council Seats Allocated
District Societies
no.
7.4%
2

Manchester

3

220

Liverpool

259

8.8%

6.7%

Leeds & Bradford

Council seats

3

Birmingham

Membership

372

1907

Council seats

1914
Membership

Membership

Council seats

Membership

Council seats

1,233

3

1,102

3

643

3

9.1%

7.5%

9.0%

6.7%

8.4%

6.7%

781

2

651

2

409

2

5.8%

5.0%

5.3%

4.4%

5.4%

4.4%

731

2

696

3

553

3

5.4%

5.0%

5.7%

6.7%

7.2%

6.7%

1,353

3

1,285

4

825

5

10.0%

7.5%

10.5%

8.9%

10.8%

11.1%

6,245

21

5,391

24

3,511

26

46.3%

52.5%

44.2%

53.3%

46.0%

57.8%

3,155

9

3,062

9

1,691

6

23.4%

22.5%

25.1%

20.0%

22.2%

13.3%

13,498

40

12,187

45

7,632

45

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

1929

Council seats

1956

1946

Membership

Source: Ms.28432/20; Membership Lists for 1947, 1957
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levels. Given these significance levels, it seems reasonable to
conclude that, before World War II, London founder firms were
continuously over-represented on Council though this effect was
diminishing, but that this was no longer the case after the war.20
TABLE 3
ICAEW Membership and Council Seats by Type of Firm

1920
Council seats
ICAEW members
1929
Council seats
ICAEW members
1939
Council seats
ICAEW members
1946
Council seats
ICAEW members
1956
Council seats
ICAEW members

London founder Other London Non-London
Total
firms
firms
firms
no.
%
no.
%
no.
%
no.
16
35.6%
10
22.2% 19 42.2% 45
100%
148
20.6%
210 29.2% 362 50.3% 720 100%
15
334

33.3%
18.4%

11
540

24.4%
29.8%

19
937

42.2% 45
100%
51.7% 1,811 100%

16
601

35.6%
23.8%

8
723

17.8% 21 46.7% 45
100%
28.6% 1,203 47.6% 2,527 100%

16
406

35.6%
27.8%

8
338

17.8%
23.1%

21
717

46.7% 45
100%
49.1% 1,461 100%

15
681

37.5%
32.4%

6
445

15.0%
21.2%

19
976

47.5% 40
100%
46.4% 2,102 100%

Source: Membership Lists for 1921, 1930, 1940, 1947, 1957

To examine further the extent to which councilors were
recruited by “a sort of ‘apostolic succession’” [Accountant, May
21, 1904, p. 669], 60 long-standing provincial firms were identified through the same procedure used to detect the 30 London
founder firms. From the combined list of 90 founder firms, we
were able to calculate that 157 (58.4%) of the 269 councilors in
public practice over the period 1880-1970 stemmed from those
origins. Even if we exclude the original 45 members, we find that
112 (50.0%) of the 224 members subsequently appointed to the
Council had the founder-firm root. Despite the rule established
in 1883, restricting to a maximum of two the number of partners
in the same firm and working from the same principal place
of business serving on the Council at the same time [Council
Minutes Book Y, p. 4; File 1490], 64 of 112 (57.1%), councilors
20
One reason for this change was that, during World War II, the London
founder-firm membership fell by only 32.5%, whereas that of other firms fell by
45.2%.��������������������������������������������������������������������������
Hence
�������������������������������������������������������������������������
the imbalance of the pre-war era was�������������������������������
����������������������������������
resolved, not by a proportionate reduction in the number of Council seats for London founder firms, but a
larger fall in membership among other firms.
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were recruited from just 19 large London firms.21 Moreover, 36
of the 112 members (32.1%) and 30 of the 64 London councilors
(46.9%) were there as the result of “apostolic succession,” i.e., a
partner from the same firm was appointed to replace a councilor
who had resigned.
Turning to business members’ representation, we have seen
that they had no representation whatsoever on the Council until
1943, and that they received their first quota allocation of five
out of 45 seats or 11.1% in 1950. We have also seen that business
members accounted for 17.2% of traceable membership as early
as 1939, and we are able to interpolate from Table 1 a business
membership of about 30% between 1946 and 1956. Later, in
1964, according to an estimate made by a GPC sub-committee,
“10,000 or more members of the Institute…are engaged in commerce and industry” [GPC Minute Book R, pp. 135-136] at a
time when the total U.K. membership was 23,285 [Membership
List, 1964]. Therefore, even when the quota was increased to 15
out of 60 in 1965, business members were still seriously underrepresented on the Council.
The evidence presented in this section reveals that, consistent with criticisms directed at the composition of the Council
by the ICAEW’s members and the press, its non-representative
character persisted throughout the period 1880-1970, despite a
series of initiatives designed to improve the situation.
A Self-Perpetuating Oligarchy – the Historical Dimension: In this
section so far, we have studied changes made by the ICAEW in
response to continuous and vehement criticism of the self-elected characteristic of the Council and the under-representation of
a variety of sectional interests. We have also seen that two world
wars provided important opportunities to review critically the
oligarchic nature of the Council. World War I made influential
chartered accountants aware of the growing importance of business accounting within the portfolio of work that constituted
contemporary professional practice and encouraged progressive practitioners, such as Mark Webster Jenkinson, to support claims from business members for representation on the
Council. World War II, against the background of a substantial
21
These included Price, Waterhouse & Co. (9 councilors); Cooper Brothers &
Co. (7); Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (6); Deloitte, Plender, Griffiths & Co. (6);
Turquand, Youngs & Co. (5); Whinney, Smith & Whinney (4); Kemp, Chatteris,
Nichols, Sendell & Co. (4); Binder, Hamlyn & Co. (4); Barton, Mayhew & Co. (4);
James & Edwards (3); Josolyne, Miles, Page & Co. (2); Harmood Banner & Co. (2);
and Cash, Stone & Co. (2).
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increase in business membership within the ICAEW, encouraged people such as E.M. Taylor again to highlight the issue of
business members’ representation.22 These findings support the
argument that “democratization tends to follow war” [Mitchell,
1999, p. 771].
We have seen that a number of changes were made that
caused the Council to become more representative of the membership in 1970 than at foundation date. Despite such changes,
however, we must conclude that the fundamental nature of the
Council, as a self-elected oligarchy, remained substantially intact,
with the mechanisms employed to defend that characteristic
including (1) the quota system used to allocate Council seats to
London and provincial societies; (2) the re-election of retiring
members; (3) the Council’s power to fill a vacancy arising between AGMs; (4) the Council’s power to choose between nominations put forward by the provincial societies; (5) the Council’s
control over the consultation process with the London & District
Society; (6) the creation of “pools” of non-practicing members
with Council retaining the power to choose between nominations
put forward; and (7) the co-option of additional “suitable” members at the absolute discretion of the Council. These mechanisms
comprise overwhelming evidence of “weak procedural guarantees in competitive elections” highlighted as important features
of an oligarchic leadership by Jenkins [1977, p. 570].
The Council of the ICAEW also exploited its command over
organizational resources [Lipset et al., 1956; Jenkins, 1977, p.
569] in other ways to maintain its traditional character and to
silence, sideline, or pacify dissatisfaction among members over
their interest representation on Council. Tactics employed included the formation of various advisory and consultative committees such as the Special Committee (1919), the London Members’ Committee (1920), the Taxation and Financial Relations
Committee (1942), the GPC Sub-Committee (Non-Practising
Members) (1951), and the Consultative Committee of Members
in Commerce and Industry (1957). These placating measures
each played a role to help to moderate members’ dissatisfaction
with the Council.
22
Taylor, a�������������������������������������������������������������������
t the 1941 AGM, stated that “I
���������������������������������������
have come to the conclusion that reforms must take place in the structure of the Council…There are many problems
facing us to-day…when the war is over and hundreds, possibly thousands, of our
members come back to civil life, and possibly 1,500 article clerks with little, if any,
professional experience come to take up business life... a broader representation
on the Council is going to be beneficial to the Institute as a whole” [Accountant,
May 17, 1941, pp. 376-377].
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The oligarchic character of the Council of the ICAEW existed from the outset and was most intensively attacked immediately following organizational formation in 1880. Michels [1962,
p. 167] observes that “With the institution of leadership there
simultaneously begins…the transformation into a closed circle.”
Osterman [2006, p. 623], on this same issue, comments that:
The question of timing…becomes the practical one of
the length of time it takes to create a self-sustaining
bureaucratic apparatus and internal political system.
Put this way, it is apparent that there is no universal answer to the timing question. It depends on the characteristics of the organization in question, such as size of
membership, geographic scope, history, and so forth.
The historical dimension is highly significant for this case
study. We have seen that the ICAEW was formed from the merger of five existing institutions. Among these, the elite body was
the Institute of Accountants which dominated the merger negotiations [Walker, 2004] and also the composition of the ICAEW’s
initial Council [Edwards et al., 2005]. The Institute of Account
ants had, in 1876, been accused by its members of arbitrary and
selective procedures for appointing councilors which, as in the
case of Kemp’s justification for an ICAEW Council consisting of
the “great and the good” in 1883, was explained by the need for
a strong public profile [Walker, 2004, p. 142]. This latter theme
was given particular emphasis by Ernest Cooper who, we have
seen, also staunchly defended the composition of the ICAEW’s
Council when president in 1901. As a highly active member of
the Institute of Accountants in the 1870s, Cooper advocated reforms directed towards achieving improved recognition for the
profession [cited in Walker, 2004, p. 291]:
Can it be doubted that if the Institute after the Scotch
System was introduced here had been actively engaged
during the past seven years in ascertaining who are
the respectable Accountants and inducing them to join
the Institute that the profession would have assumed
a much higher position in relation to the contemplated
Bankruptcy reform?
For Cooper, to increase the number of “respectable” accountants
within the small membership of the elite Institute of Account
ants and to have “the best possible men” on the Council of the
ICAEW were probably consistent objectives in the sense that
both enhanced the influence of the organization in making representation to the government over the content of legislation rehttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss2/2
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lating to the accountants’ business. We might therefore conclude
[see also, Walker, 2004, p. 139] that the Council of the Institute
of Accountants in London institutionalized its character as a
self-perpetuating elite during the 1870s, an historical characteristic inherited by the ICAEW.
The most important difference between the real case of the
Council of the ICAEW and oligarchy typically envisaged in the
political theory of organization is in motive. In theory, oligarchy
emerges because the positions occupied by leaders of the organization “provide them with economic rewards and social status”
[Osterman, 2006, p. 623]. However, in the process whereby the
ICAEW Council initially formed and subsequently maintained
an oligarchic characteristic, evidence of the councilors enjoying
direct personal gains from their positions remains unidentified,
although, as Smallpeice [1944, p. 46] recognized, achieving the
position of councilor itself represented “a high honour for practising members and is much prized…as a mark of esteem and
a reward for outstanding service in the profession.” Aside from
personal motives, the dominant concern when constructing the
composition of the Council was to maintain and enhance, as
indicated by Kemp’s 1883 comment, the political influence of
the ICAEW in making representations to the government over,
for example, the content of legislation relating to its business.
From its experience when acquiring the Royal Charter in 1880,
the Council of the ICAEW appears to have assumed that the influence of councilors from the London founding firms would be
of crucial importance for the purpose of maintaining its political
standing.
Reflecting its oligarchic character, the biased composition
of Council proved highly significant in a negative sense at the
time of the 1970 scheme for integrating the six senior professional accountancy bodies in Britain. It was members who were
either not represented or under-represented on the Council that
featured prominently in rejecting the leadership’s plans. The political crisis is next examined.
THE 1970 INTEGRATION SCHEME
The 1970 merger plan had been approved by five of the
six senior professional bodies involved when, “virtually at the
last moment, a campaign was launched by two members of
the English Institute” [Tricker, 1983, p. 40]. H.T. Nicholson and
B.W. Sutherland criticized the integration scheme as involving
“an unacceptable dilution of the high professional standards
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of the Institute” [Accountant, July 16, 1970, p. 73]. It is widely
acknowledged that, principally as the result of latent opposition
mobilized by their intervention, the integration scheme was rejected by 16,845 votes against 13,700 with 64.1% of the ICAEW’s
membership taking part in the poll.
For Nicholson and Sutherland, the scheme had been projected by “‘men in a hurry’, who refused to recognize that sound
development could only come by a process of steady evolution,
and were obsessed with the idea of creating the biggest body
of accountants in the world” [Accountant, July 16, 1970, p. 73].
As far as business members were concerned, integration would
result in “people [becoming] called chartered accountants
who have never worked in a professional office” [Accountancy,
September 1970, p. 635; see also, File 1477: 17 (34)]. For provincial practitioners, integration was considered to produce “an
unacceptable dilution” of status [Accountant, July 16, 1970, p.
73; see also, Accountancy, September 1970, pp. 635, 637]. And
for younger members who had recently suffered the trauma of
qualifying examinations, integration was seen as a retrograde
step that would lessen the value of the chartered credential [Accountancy, June 1966, p. 443].
The outcome was described in the ICAEW’s mouthpiece,
Accountancy [September 1970, p. 637], as “a disaster for the accountancy profession as a whole, and for the Institute especially,” while The Accountant [August 20, 1970, pp. 229-230] made
the following assessment of events:
it might have been tempting to accuse a few individuals,
whose opposition has been particularly determined and
perhaps more articulate than most, of having wrecked
the scheme; but it seems plain that these gentlemen
have done nothing more than to provide, at the most,
a focus for the considerable measure of dissatisfaction
and dissent which already existed.
Within the confines of Moorgate Place, similar sentiments
were expressed in a less gracious manner by the then-president
of the ICAEW, C. Croxton-Smith [Council Minutes Book AC, p.
383]:
Over the past ten years…some 20,000 new members
had been admitted. Many of these were in small industrial companies and felt that they derived little benefit
from membership other than the qualification which
they wished to retain at a minimum cost. The integration scheme had produced an unholy alliance between
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these members and some small practitioners whose motives for rejection of the proposals were quite different.
The people leading opposition to the scheme, Nicholson and
Sutherland, partly attributed failure of the integration initiative
to the fact [Accountancy, September 1970, p. 636] that:
the Council [of the ICAEW] is not really in touch with
the body of the members. They are all very busy men,
and we are certainly not attacking them personally. It
is more a fault of the system. There should be far fewer
papers to read, and more chances to talk to the ‘constituents’…If they are not careful they lose touch with
grass-roots opinion, and this is what happened in this
case.
An in-depth study of the integration episode conducted by
Shackleton and Walker [2001, pp. 277-278] locates the “detachment of office bearers [the Council] from their constituents [the
members]” as “perhaps the most notable feature of the unification attempt of the 1960s.” They continue [Shackleton and
Walker, 2001, pp. 277, 280; see also, Willmott, 1986, p. 571]: “As
was starkly revealed in August 1970, it is ultimately the memberships of the professional bodies who have the power to accept or
reject constitutional change,” and conclude: “The price of a disdainful and non-consultative approach towards the membership
was revealed when the result of the ICAEW ballot was declared.”
Evidence of “Detachment” and “Disdain”: The under-representation of business members and provincial practitioners on the
Council was not, therefore, simply a matter of principle; the
biased composition had implications for how the ruling body
behaved. It meant that they failed to comprehend the conflict
between the priorities of business, provincial, and also younger
members compared with those of the leadership dominated by
the big London firms. But it went even further than that and,
in this sub-section, building on Shackleton and Walker’s [2001]
findings, we present specific evidence of a lack of respect on
the part of the Council for legitimate concerns expressed by the
membership.
Statements of Auditing: A series of Statements of Auditing was
launched by the ICAEW in 1958 to help auditors fulfill their
obligation under the Companies Act 1948 to express an opinion
on whether a company’s published accounts “give a true and
fair view” [T&R Committee Minutes Book B, p. 259]. The series
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was soon the subject of severe criticism from regional district
societies. For example, the Statement dealing with the auditor’s
duty in relation to stock-in-trade (1961) was opposed by five
provincial societies (Manchester, Northern, Nottingham, South
Eastern, and South Wales) on the grounds that it was “in some
respects in advance of current practice and might prejudice the
position of auditors in law by appearing to render attendance
at stocktaking mandatory” [T&R Committee Minutes Book C,
p. 164]. The Manchester Society was particularly worried about
the workload of the small practitioner [Council Minutes Book
T, p. 235], while the London & District Society drew attention
to the apprehension expressed by a “substantial minority” of its
membership to an official document that amounted to a “voluntary extension of the auditor’s responsibility” [London & District
Society Minutes Book D, p. 98].
The Chairman of the ICAEW’s Parliamentary and Law Committee, H.A. Benson of Cooper Brothers, nevertheless informed
the January 1962 meeting of Council [Council Minutes Book T,
p. 212] that:
it was in the interests of the profession that the document [on stock] should be issued as soon as possible
particularly having regard to the [Ninth] International
Congress [of Accountants] to be held in New York in
September 1962 when it was important that the Institute should be able to demonstrate that it is a leader in
auditing standards.
It appears that political considerations arising from the U.S.
case of McKesson & Robbins (1939)23 were driving the leadership’s actions. The Council attempted to make “attendance to
observe stocktaking” an effective obligation for small as well as
large public practices partly, at least, to enable the ICAEW to be
seen as leading the development of U.K. auditing standards at
the upcoming event.24

23
When accepting the audit of McKesson & Robbins Ltd. in 1924, Price, Waterhouse & Co. agreed not to make a physical examination of inventories. One
consequence was an audit failure to detect $10,100,000 of fictitious stock and the
introduction of U.S. regulations requiring this to be done [Baxter, 1999, pp. 157,
162; Previts and Merino, 1979, p. 259].
24
Another example of a disregard for views expressed by provincial practitioners occurred in 1966 when “a majority of the regions” opposed the issue of a
statement on “auditing procedures in connection with the verification of investments” [Various Sub-Committees Minutes Book D, p. 102].
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Fellowship Rules: The ICAEW’s Royal Charter divided membership into two categories, fellows and associates, with senior
fellowship status confined to those who had been continuously
in practice as public accountants for five years. With business
members often leaving public practice soon after qualification, it
was therefore unusual for them to achieve fellowship status. As
early as 1922, several issues of The Accountant [March 11, 1922,
p. 331; March 18, 1922, p. 384; April 15, 1922, p. 507] published
letters from business members requesting an extension of the
fellowship arrangements.
We have seen that, as the number of business members increased significantly (Table 1), pressure for representation on the
Council grew. The same was the case with the fellowship issue,
with H.F. Bowser and J. Sandford Smith tackling the secretary
of the ICAEW, R.W. Bankes, on the issue in 1944. Because of the
two-tier scheme of credentials, in Bowser’s estimation, “the view
is fairly generally held that Associate Members of the Institute in
England are a kind of inferior brand of Chartered Accountant”
[Ms.28435/2; File 0436]. Sandford Smith also focused on the
implications of the fellowship rules within the public domain
[Ms.28435/2; File 0436]:
While all accountants know that 5 years in practice is
the only qualification at present called for to obtain the
fellowship, the business world generally is not aware of
this fact and attaches a notable degree of importance to
the difference between an A.C.A. and a F.C.A.
The request for access to fellowship status was referred to
the Charter and Bye-laws Sub-Committee in 1946, where it was
resisted by such luminaries as Sir Harold Howitt of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. [Ms.28435/2; File 0436]. Council’s negative decision drew a critical response from business members,
eliciting a promise to review the matter and solicit the views of
district societies [Accountant, May 1, 1948, p. 345]. Despite the
discovery that seven district societies either favored or had no
objection to reform, compared with five against, the GPC reported that “there is no real demand for fellowship from the general
body of associates not in practice” and that “fellowship should
continue to mark responsibility of the accountant in practice”
[File 0436]. The Council in January 1950 confirmed the GPC’s
conclusion that “it is undesirable that a new bye-law be introduced to provide for the election to fellowship of members not
in practice” [Council Minutes Book O, p. 47].
Dispute over the extension of fellowship status to business
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members rumbled on and was not settled until the proposal that
“associates [automatically] become fellows on the first day of
January which follows the completion of ten years’ membership
of the Institute” [Council Minutes Book S, pp. 2-3] was carried
at the 1959 AGM and confirmed overwhelmingly by a vote of
14,231 in favor compared with 3,825 against.
The detached and disdainful attitude of the Council towards
the wider membership is further reflected in a report prepared
by a GPC sub-committee (1964) at around the time that the
move for integration was about to surface. It contained the following somewhat arrogant assertion in relation to governance
[GPC Minutes Book S, p. 58]:
Whilst constitutionally members of the Council are
elected by the membership as a whole, the Council cannot absolve itself from the responsibility for ensuring
that only men of right calibre and who between them
cover the wide range of knowledge which is needed on
standing committees [of the Council] are selected.
The report added [GPC Minutes Book R, pp. 135-136]:
whilst it is right that due regard be paid to services rendered to a district society, the emphasis when considering the election of new members [of the Council] must
be designed to secure the services of the best men in
the profession compatible with the current needs of the
Council.
ELECTORAL REFORMS POST 1970
Rejection of the integration scheme spectacularly revealed
the willingness and ability of the rank-and-file to challenge the
authority of the Council. Moreover, it provided “a dramatic
shock to traditional ideas about [the ICAEW’s form of] governance” [Tricker, 1983, pp. 40-41], and, as an immediate response
to the “disaster” [Accountancy, September 1970, p. 637], the
Council appointed a Committee chaired by Douglas Morpeth of
Touche Ross with broad terms of reference, “to consider the objectives of the Institute and the policies it should pursue” [Council Minutes Book AC, p. 275]. The accounting press welcomed
the appointment of a young committee with “an average age
of 44” [Accountant, October 15, 1970, p. 502] which comprised
“members from all sides of the profession, including those in
practices both large and small, those employed in a range of
capacities by industrial companies of various sizes, and those in
education” [Accountancy, November 1970, p. 756].
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss2/2

32

Noguchi and Edwards: Professional leadership and oligarchy: The case of the ICAEW
Noguchi and Edwards, ICAEW Leadership

33

The Morpeth Committee reiterated concerns that appointments to the Council were not made on a “fully democratic basis” [Accountant, February 24, 1972, p. 237]. Recommendations
for district society-based elections by postal ballot were judged
to have three advantages – elections would be democratic; there
would be a greater likelihood of members knowing the candidates; and it might also stimulate the interest of members in
their local society’s activities. Accountancy [June 1971, p. 293]
welcomed the proposals on the grounds that “Many members
look upon the Council as some form of self-perpetuating oligarchy” whereas “a postal ballot will appear more democratic to the
average member.”
The Council presented the proposals to a special meeting
on September 27, 1972, where they were approved with 6,792
(97.5%) votes in favor and just 173 against [Accountant, October
5, 1972, p. 416]. Accountancy [April 1983, p. 25] later assessed
the underlying philosophy of the reforms in a broadly favorable
manner:
a system of regular Council elections by District Society areas was introduced [in 1972], giving members a
decisive role in the selection and control of Council…
In particular, the Council considers it both ‘entirely
proper and in accordance with modern practice’ that a
democratically-elected Council should have the power
to manage the Institute’s affairs.
We can conclude that the Morpeth Committee’s central recommendations, direct election at district society level by postal
ballot was an important break from the past system for electing
councilors.
Subsequent Developments: At the time of the 1972 reforms, The
Accountant [July 6, 1972, p. 3] conjectured that the new arrangements might “place upon the membership a heavier burden than
some have hitherto shown themselves prepared to bear…apathy
and inanition, unless checked, could rapidly prevent the new
measures from accomplishing anything better.” These concerns
proved well-founded with annual elections conducted under the
new scheme between 1973 and 199425 attracting turnouts ranging from 15.2% to 24.1% [File 1490]. In Tricker’s [1983, p. 30] es25
In 1995, further important amendments to the system of election were
made as the term of election was shortened from six to four years; the number of
elected members enlarged from 60 to 70; and the introduction of “assured” seats,
with one seat per constituency reserved for a business member [File 1489].
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timation, “the Institute is remote from the immediate concerns
of most members and its governance is a matter of singularly
little importance to them.” This loss of commitment and energy
on the part of the membership, a typical symptom of oligarchic
leadership, is called “becalming” by Zald and Ash [1966, p. 334]
and described as follows by Michels [1962, pp. 60-61]:
The indifference which in normal times the mass is accustomed to display in ordinary political life becomes,
in certain cases of particular importance, an obstacle
to the extension of the party influence. The crowd may
abandon the leaders at the very moment when these
are preparing for energetic action…Accustomed to be
ruled, the rank and file need a considerable work of
preparation before they can be set in motion.
As a consequence of the oligarchic leadership structure that
dated from the creation of the ICAEW, the membership seems
to have eventually lost interest in the election of councilors,26
but when major strategic decisions need to be made, as in
1970, they are galvanized into action. For example, plans for
the introduction of radical, new current cost accounting-based
financial reporting models were the subject of revolts, led by D.
Keymer and M. Haslam, that produced turnouts of 46% (28,696)
of the membership to reject Exposure Draft 18 in 1977 and
41.4% (30,557) to vote on calls for the “immediate withdrawal”
of Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 16 two years later
[Tweedie and Whittington, 1984, pp. 135-136, 147-148]. Merger
initiatives involving CIPFA in 1990 and 2005 also generated substantial turnouts, 36% and 44% respectively. Indeed, the issues
that motivated members into action included not only those directly affecting their immediate interests, but also those that did
26
In this connection, Leach [2005, p. 331] suggests that “It could be that the
majority was happy to leave the work of governance to a minority, as long as that
minority remained accountable and did not jeopardize the majority’s interests.
But as often happens with long-term incumbency, this abdication of responsibility,
however consensual it might be, can easily lead to a situation of dependence where
people do not feel entitled or qualified to intervene – even when they suspect
their interests are being threatened – because they have not been involved in the
process.” If the minority then indeed makes illegitimate decisions exceeding the
range consigned by, and threatening the interests of, the majority, the situation
clearly illustrates a case in which directional flow of causation between oligarchic
leadership and members’ loss of commitment is reversed. However, in the case
of the ICAEW during the period from 1880 to 1970, the reversed directional
flow of causation is inapplicable because the oligarchic character of the Council
existed from the outset in 1880, and a series of members’ requests for reform then
followed at least up until 1965.
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not, such as the Council’s plan to introduce options into the final
examination. Moreover, the membership even proved capable
of instigating a radical scheme designed to achieve democratic
election of the ICAEW’s president, an initiative pursued for the
purpose of avoiding maldistribution of power and “to make sure
one section of the membership [Council] does not exercise tyranny” [Accountancy, July 1996, p. 11].
When the new electoral system was introduced in 1972, Accountancy [August 1972, p. 4] drew attention to the difficulty of
recruiting suitable candidates from under-represented sectors
and specifically suggested that “it will be no easier for senior
employees of larger companies to serve on the Council under
the new system than under the old.” It was anticipated that at
least some of these concerns could be effectively addressed by
substantially increasing the Council’s powers to co-opt, from 6
to 20 members, but achievement of a proper balance between
job interests in fact proved elusive. The number of elected business members initially increased from 15 (25.0% of a total of 60
elected councilors) in 1972 to 18 (30.0%) in 1981, but then fell to
10 (16.7%) by 1994. Compared with their total U.K. membership
(37.8% in 1983, 40.2% in 1990, and 57.3% in 2001), business
members remained heavily under-represented on a Council still
dominated by practitioners.27 This continued imbalance did
nothing to resolve concerns about the availability to the Council
of the full range of specialist knowledge impinging upon the
activities of the ICAEW’s membership. Another cause of anxiety
was the lack of continuity in the expertise available to the Council, with 137 new members elected as the result of vacancies
arising during the period from 1973 to 1994. To address these
issues, the Council made good use of its extended power to coopt, with such members rising from three (4.8% of a total of 80
councilors) in 1972 to the full complement of 20 (25%) ten years
later [Council Minutes Books AA-AV; File 1490]. This enabled
the Council to bring in business members and academics to
supply specialist knowledge not otherwise available to it, as well
as past-presidents and former chairs of Council committees to
supply “executive talents” [Tricker, 1983, p. 27], experience, and
continuity in the governance of Institute affairs.
Nevertheless, continuing concern with the lack of interest
and involvement of the members in the elections of councilors
and, therefore, the lack of Council’s own legitimacy, led to a
27
File 0433; File 7-8-5; Accountancy, August 1990, p. 162; http://www.icaew.
co.uk/institute/statistics/document.asp.
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s eries of committees being appointed (Worsley 1983-1985, Green
1990-1991, Woodley 1993, Gerrard 1996) whose reports resulted
in a plethora of administrative changes to the composition of the
Council (e.g.; increase in elected membership to 70, extension
of powers of co-option to include large-firm partners, younger
members, and chairs of Boards and Faculties) and the system
of governance (e.g.; creation of the office of chief executive, the
Executive Committee, and the office of secretary-general).
The Council also strove to reach out to different segments of
the membership and, thereby, directly stimulate interest in Institute affairs by establishing “Boards,” “Faculties,” and “Focus
Groups” [Accountancy, November 1985, p. 181; June 2000, p.
10]. These initiatives succeeded as judged by the numbers joining [Accountancy, January 1991, p. 15; July 2000, p. 24; August
2000, p. 24], but failed to connect the members’ interests with
the election of councilors which continued to be based on the
geographical areas represented by the district societies without
giving any electorate status to these job-interest groups.
We can therefore see that, in the period following the political crisis of 1970, the Council made serious efforts to overcome
symptoms of oligarchic leadership and revitalize the membership [Voss and Sharman, 2000, pp. 304-305]. In the Council’s
own words, since 1970, it has searched for “the methods by
which we could ensure that Council is representative of the
membership; the steps to be taken to involve members fully in
policy development; the [better] relationship of district societies
with Moorgate Place; and the way in which we look after the
interests of our members” [Accountancy, June 1991, p. 8]. However, the fact that members still remained disconnected in 1991,
and there is no evidence that the situation has since improved, is
indicated in the following comment made in that year [Account
ancy, December 1991, p. 20]:
a growing number of members have been asking whether the services the Institute provides represent value for
money. From their point of view, the increasing financial burden of maintaining the chartered accountancy
title, at a time when resources are under pressure,
involves a substantial outflow of those resources for
which they say that they see little in return in terms of
protecting and representing their interests.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Between 1880 and 1970, the Council of the ICAEW responded to membership requests for better representation by making
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss2/2
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changes to the constitution of the Council. These changes failed
to alter the fundamental nature of the Council as a self-elective
oligarchy substantially biased in favor of large London founder
firms. This historically contingent but deep-seated characteristic
of the Council was protected mainly through (1) continuous
re-election of retiring members; (2) Council’s control over the
process of filling vacancies; and (3) arrangements for the Council to co-opt “suitable” members. The Council also silenced,
sidelined, or pacified dissatisfaction among members concerning lack of representation on the Council by creating various
advisory and consultative committees. Consistent with the literature of political theory [Lipset et al., 1956; Jenkins, 1977, p.
569], these are the tactics that the leadership of an organization
typically wields to maintain its oligarchic character. However,
the Council wished to maintain its traditional character, not
principally for the purpose of direct personal gain as normally
envisaged by the political theory of organization, but mainly to
maintain political influence [Richardson, 1989; Walker, 2004,
p.142] when making representations to the government over
the content of legislation relating to the practicing accountants’
business.
This historical study has revealed that the oligarchic character of Council, as theoretically prescribed, caused the leadership to become complacent, possibly disdainful, and certainly
detached from the interests of the membership, as demonstrated
when issuing Statements of Auditing and, for many years, resisting changes to the fellowship rules. These kinds of actions,
combined with the continuing dissatisfaction with lack of
representation on the Council, resulted in the disregarded sections – business members, provincial practitioners, and younger
members – being mainly responsible for rejecting the integration
scheme in 1970.
Between 1970 and1972, the electoral system of Council was
reformed, with an internal review acknowledging the fact that
under the new arrangements, there could “be no restriction on
the way the electorate nominates or votes and no attempt by the
Council to ‘rig’ elections by insisting on a specified type of candidate or preventing certain candidates from standing. It was for
the electorate itself to determine such matters” [File 1490].
The reforms introduced district society-based elections by
postal ballot and have been hailed as “An attempt…to involve
members in the governance process, to emphasize the geographical constituencies and to highlight the representation of
members on Council” [Tricker, 1983, p. 41]. In practice, the new
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system failed to arouse members from their “becalmed” attitude
[Zald and Ash, 1966] towards ICAEW affairs. Nor have numerous subsequent initiatives proved successful in increasing the
general level of membership involvement in Council elections.
When, however, the leadership has attempted to take the ICAEW
in some radical new direction, the level of interest becomes
relatively substantial and opposition to the Council’s plans often
unambiguous.
In brief, actions taken by the rank-and-file have persistently
shown that Council’s authority remains seriously diminished.
Although the Council installed a more democratic system for
electing new leaders, it failed to stimulate the members’ interest
so that they might connect better with the leadership. While we
do not claim that the 1970 debacle irretrievably damaged the authority of the leadership, it is certainly the case that the “disaster” fundamentally problematized the governance arrangements
and heralded the start of a period of continuous reform that has
not borne fruit.
Within the U.K., the ICAEW is not alone in grappling with
problems of governance. A recent academic study [Friedman
and Phillips, 2004] of models of control within professional associations reports the conclusions of a seminar held at Birkbeck
College, University of London (November 28, 2000), entitled
“Governance for Professional Associations in the 21st Century.”
The seminar, arranged by the Professional Association Research
Network (PARN), was attended by representatives of 35 professional bodies, including the ICAEW.28 These delegates shared
a concern that their governance structures were inadequate to
meet the demands placed on them. In particular, they identified
“composition of councils and electoral process” as a major issue
leading to difficulties in conducting policy formulation and in
arriving at strategic decisions [Friedman and Phillips, 2004, pp.
194-195]. Friedman and Phillips [2004, p. 188] conclude that
“Even the associations of professionals from which many top
business executives are drawn, such as accountancy and law,
have suffered from crisis and failures in governance.”
The PARN seminar is significant in highlighting the problem of leadership legitimacy faced by professional bodies today.
When considering how best to reform the constitution of the
28
The seminar led to the PARN undertaking a research project co-sponsored
by the ICAEW. The research findings were presented at a seminar, entitled “Governance: the management of change and the management of risk,” held at Woburn
House, Tavistock Square, London, on January 8, 2003.
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Council, the ICAEW had in fact researched and sometimes
imitated election arrangements put in place by the governing
bodies of other professional associations. Such bodies included
not only other accountancy associations but also other professional organizations such as the Law Society, Royal College of
Surgeons, Royal Institute of British Architects, and the Chartered Surveyors’ Institution [Ms.28432/19; Ms.28448]. Through
the PARN, or alternative forums, the ICAEW might gain further
insights into the measures taken by other bodies to deal with
the legitimacy issue. To promote the mutual learning process,
further research into other organizations might help clarify the
nature of the issue of governance of professional associations by,
for example, comparison with the case of the ICAEW.29
For the present, this study enables us to predict that the
ICAEW’s quest for a scheme to address better the need for representative and effective governance of a professional body will
continue into the future and, until that problem is resolved, the
crisis of authority that the Council has repeatedly experienced in
its recent history is likely to recur.
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